Post-Protest Bangladesh Faces Test of Reform

Bangladesh’s first widely credible election in nearly two decades delivered a landslide victory for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its leader, Tarique Rahman, the son of a former prime minister who recently returned after 17 years of self-imposed exile.

The election was made possible by a Generation Z-led uprising that security forces tried to suppress, reportedly killing at least 1,400 people. What began as a student protest against a controversial job quota system, widely seen as a tool of political patronage, quickly grew into a nationwide movement that eventually brought down the government.

Many protesters had hoped for more than the fall of an authoritarian regime. They wanted a break from old-style politics and a meaningful role for young people in shaping the country’s future. What has emerged so far, however, falls short of those aspirations. Unless the new government delivers genuine reform, fresh unrest cannot be ruled out.

The Uprising

The 2024 protests that toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina began after the High Court reinstated a 30% quota in public sector jobs for descendants of 1971 war veterans, leaving less than half of government jobs open to merit-based recruitment.

In a country struggling with high youth unemployment, many young people viewed the system as unfair and politically motivated. Organised under the banner of Students Against Discrimination, the protests spread rapidly across the country through road and railway blockades.

The government’s response turned a policy dispute into a national political crisis. Members of the ruling party’s student wing attacked protesters, while authorities imposed a nationwide curfew, shut down the internet and ordered security forces to use lethal force.

But the crackdown backfired. Protesters documented incidents on their phones, and once internet access was partially restored, videos circulated widely and weakened the government’s narrative that demonstrators were violent agitators.

One of the most powerful images of the uprising was the killing of student coordinator Abu Sayed, who was filmed standing unarmed with his arms outstretched before police opened fire.

On 5 August 2024, facing a mass march on her residence, Sheikh Hasina fled to India by military helicopter.

Reforms in the Balance

Three days later, Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as Chief Adviser to the interim government. His appointment was seen as a major victory for the student movement, which had made clear it would not accept a military-backed administration.

The interim government launched reform commissions on the constitution, corruption, the judiciary, police and public administration. It also negotiated the July National Charter with political parties, containing 84 reform proposals aimed at reducing the concentration of power in the prime minister’s office and making future state capture more difficult.

Most political parties signed the charter in October 2025.

However, the path to the election remained controversial. The International Crimes Tribunal convicted Sheikh Hasina in absentia on charges of crimes against humanity and sentenced her to death. Later, in May 2025, the interim government banned the Awami League under anti-terrorism legislation.

International observers warned that excluding the country’s largest political party could disenfranchise millions of voters and weaken the democratic legitimacy of the election.

The election schedule was also disputed. The BNP pushed for an early vote, while the newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), created by Gen Z protest leaders, wanted more time to organise and ensure reforms were institutionalised first. In the end, the BNP’s position prevailed.

A Political Dynasty Returns

The BNP and its allies won 209 of the 299 contested seats, securing a two-thirds majority in parliament.

Jamaat-e-Islami, whose 2013 ban had been lifted by the interim government, emerged as the main opposition force with nearly 80 seats, its strongest result to date.

The NCP won only six of the 30 seats it contested.

Its weak performance was partly structural. Formed in February 2025, the party had limited time to build a nationwide organisation and lacked funding and rural networks. But some of its setbacks were also self-inflicted.

Its alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami as part of an 11-party coalition alienated many young supporters who had hoped for a genuinely new political alternative. Several prominent NCP figures resigned in protest and ran as independents.

Even so, NCP leader Nahid Islam, just 27, won a parliamentary seat, and the party has pledged to rebuild from the opposition benches.

A Better Election, But Questions Remain

The election marked a significant improvement over Bangladesh’s recent polls. Voter turnout reached 60%, up from 42% in the widely criticised 2024 election.

More than 60% of voters also backed the July Charter in a referendum held alongside the election, giving the reform agenda a clear democratic mandate.

Still, the vote would have carried greater legitimacy had all political parties been allowed to participate freely. The campaign period was also marred by violence, with rights groups reporting that at least 16 political activists were killed ahead of polling day.

The BNP now inherits a state apparatus deeply politicised over years of one-party dominance, while also holding a commanding parliamentary majority with few effective checks on its power.

Whether it will govern differently from its predecessors or simply adapt to the same culture of control remains uncertain.

The young people whose uprising made this election possible are watching closely. They have already helped bring down one government. The new administration would be wise not to forget that.